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ABSTRACT 
We study the deinstitutionalization of a controversial practice that had previously 
reached a level of international diffusion. We draw on international diffusion and 
deinstitutionalization theory to study the emergence and diffusion of the third-party 
ownership practice in the soccer industry. We use an inductive case study combining archival 
and interview data to study the determinants of the international diffusion of a controversial 
practice at a global scale, the contestation, and finally the deinstitutionalization process that 
resulted from the ban of the practice. We find that the opacity of the practice can be a 
diffusion driver, locally and at the international level, nevertheless the opacity also may lead 
to different meaning creation attempts and potential discursive battles between actors, and 
eventually to deinstitutionalization of the practice. This article advances our understanding 
of how controversial practices fare in different institutional environments.  
 
INTRODUCTION 
The striker Radamel Falcao of Atletico Madrid, was transferred in 2011 to AS Monaco for 
a whopping fee of $70 million. Atletico Madrid, despite being in financial trouble, had 
acquired Falcao from Oporto FC (Portuguese club) for $45 million only a year ago, in 2010. 
How could a financially troubled club like Atletico have acquired the star player that helped 
them to generate an additional income of $25 million? As the financial crisis hit Portuguese 
and Spanish soccer clubs, limiting their options to raise debt to bring in new talent, 
investment groups stepped in to help the clubs to participate in the lucrative European transfer 
market. The investment groups used an innovative practice common in Brazil and Argentina. 
The investor would alleviate the financial strain of the club in exchange of a share of the 
player’s economic rights. The practice, known as Third Party Ownership (TPO) describes 
the arrangement that allows for a third-party ownership on a professional soccer player. As 
the practice diffused, it started to raise concerns in some of the soccer institutions in Europe 
(UEFA) on the possible manipulation by external investors in the fairness of the competitions 
and the transparency of the transfer market. As a result of a lengthy contestation process, 
FIFA (top international institution in soccer) instructed a global ban of the practice to take 
effect in 2015 (FIFA, 2015a). Prior research has explored the fate of institutionally contested 
new practices such as the one described above (Jung and Mun, 2016; Reinmoeller and Ansari 
2016; Sanders and Tuschke, 2007; Briscoe and Murphy, 2012; Davis & Greve, 1997; Fiss, 
Kennedy, & Davis, 2012). However, much of this work conflate diffusion of these practices 
and their institutionalization (for exceptions, see Jung and Mun, 2016; Reinmoeller and 
Ansari 2016) although, recently few authors argued that these processes are analytically 
separate (Colyvas and Johnson, 2011). In addition, most of these studies shed light on how 
these practices evolved in a single institutional environment, providing little information on 
how they may fare in multiple institutional environments. Furthermore, we know very little 
about how key international constituents interpret and respond to the diffusion of 
institutionally contested practices due to differences of norms and values in their 
corresponding international context.  
In order to follow the full life cycle of an institutionally contested practice in different 
institutional environments, we conducted an inductive study (Eisenhardt, 1989) documenting 
the advent of the third party ownership practice (TPO) in Latin America starting from the 
2000s and its subsequent diffusion and deinstitutionalization in Europe in 2015 due to the 
contestation by key international constituents. To answer our multi-faceted research question, 
we combined archival documents and 17 interviews with key informants in the soccer 
industry. Our findings show that institutionally contested innovative practices may diffuse 
and get institutionalized within their local markets due to the effort of the diffusing actors, 
however, they may face contestation by other actors and international institutions when they 
are diffused to international markets, leading to their eventual deinstitutionalization. We 
uncover the mechanisms of diffusion and deinstitutionalization, and while doing that, we also 
provide a multi-faceted account of different institutional actors, some supporting, some 
opposing this practice. Furthermore, we depict that the opaqueness of the practice helped the 
diffusion process as predicted by the previous literature (Briscoe and Murphy, 2012, 
Reinmoeller and Ansari, 2016) but the opaqueness also allowed the opposing parties to 
construct negative interpretations of the practice within the field. The power imbalances 
between actors generates a hierarchical contestation process, which can lead to the 
deinstitutionalization of the practice. 
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